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I.

Executive Summary

The Department of Defense is one of the highest costs to the United States government at
any given time. However, as two foreign wars have been going on for nearly 10 years, the
amount of resources needed is significantly higher than usual. This increase in required funds is
necessary for military personnel salaries, military equipment, government personnel supporting
the Department of Defense, along with support services provided by private military
contractors. There have been several recent studies reviewing the effectiveness of contractors
on the battlefield, but most overlook those supporting the warfighter at home. While there are
many different factors to consider when evaluating the cost effectiveness of private military
contractors, this study attempts to find the best use of taxpayer dollars in order to provide the
most efficient support for the soldiers in the field. Security is something that everyone values,
but is something that is difficult to assign a set value.
This study relies on data gathered regarding annual compensation rates for contractor
and government civilian personnel, annual oversight costs, issues regarding fraud and
mismanagement of funds, as well as the flexibility of the workforce. An extensive literature
review is completed in order to understand some of the benefits that are provided by
contractors that are difficult to place a monetary value on. This capstone focuses on contract
specialists and system administrators in both government and private industry in order to get a
broader analysis of how two different career fields are uniquely affected by outsourcing. The
findings suggest significant cost savings with civilian personnel, but the other factors must be
considered based on customer requirements, length of project, and type of work to be
performed. Overall, the findings suggest that domestic support of the warfighter is most cost
efficiently provided by the government civilian personnel. The data also suggest that there
needs to be greater funding put into oversight of contractors to ensure that taxpayer dollars
are not vulnerable to fraud and abuse. Further analysis of lifetime costs is recommended in
order to better understand how private military contractors may be able to provide a more cost
efficient service to the federal government.
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II.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

The size of the National Debt, two foreign wars, and the financial crisis have raised many
questions regarding the efficiency of government spending. Outsourcing is one of the many
issues often addressed by public leaders in order to increase the efficiency of government
spending. During the Reagan administration, there was a desire for a leaner federal work force,
which led to a significant increase in private military contractors. President George H.W. Bush
continued in the path of Reagan in support of a leaner government by outsourcing positions
throughout the federal government. President Clinton was not opposed to outsourcing either,
as he saw it as a method of balancing the budget and creating a more efficient government.
President George W. Bush more than doubled the expenditures on contracting during his
tenure in office, bringing it to over $400 billion. The Obama administration on the other hand is
now pushing for a decrease in contractor personnel with the goal of increasing the
opportunities for government civilians (Zwerdling 2009). The Department of Defense has over
19,000 authorizations for new personnel, in an attempt to decrease the reliance on contractors.
Many of these positions are focused on the acquisition workforce, which includes all personnel
involved in the procurement process. Over 7,000 positions will be conversions directly from
contractor positions to civil service employees (Weigelt 2010). This administration is dedicated
to increasing the size of the federal workforce by drastically scaling back the size of the private
military contractor support.
With a two front war that has been going on for almost ten years, there is more focus
on these contractors and the cost to the government and how they are affecting the ability of
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the United States military to complete the mission. However, outsourcing does not stop with
the Department of Defense. These changes have affected most of the agencies within the
federal government (Seidman 1998), and continue to affect them up to the present day. While
increasing contractor support creates a leaner government workforce, it does not appear to
decrease the size of government expenditures. The question arises, does outsourcing
adequately address the issues of large government and high spending? Increased government
spending can be viewed as a problem, especially in a time of financial crisis as is currently the
case. While increased spending could be justified to stimulate the economy, all taxpayer dollars
should be spent in order to obtain the highest quality of services for a given cost, or to obtain a
given level of services at the lowest cost. The decision must be made whether quality of service
or price is the most important factor. In the end the Department of Defense is concerned
about providing security for citizens, and taxpayers hope they are obtaining the most cost
effective services available. The research question I address is, while contractors do offer skills
and expertise in some fields; do they actually provide a more cost effective option to hiring
civilian employees?
The question of the cost-effectiveness of contractors has been brought to the forefront
more recently within the Department of Defense as there are many contractors assisting in the
mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. The positions filled by contractors range from very technical
positions to administrative and everywhere in between. Many of the services provided by the
private military contractors could also be provided by government civilian employees.
However, many recent studies focus more on the cost-effectiveness of contractors on the
battlefield. While this is a very important question in its own right, no one seems to have
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touched more than cursorily on the many positions domestically of contractors in the federal
government.
In order to adequately address this question, I conduct an extensive literature review.
This literature includes academic articles discussing the many different factors affecting what
benefits there are to using government civilians compared to contractors. Another important
area of literature that I look at includes reports produced by the Government Accountability
Office, Congressional Budget office, and other Congressional reports.
As stated previously, cost is not the only factor to be considered when evaluating what
is the best bang for the tax-payers dollar. This capstone evaluates the cost factor for both
government civilians and contractors. In addition to cost, I look at the flexibility of the
workforce, the scope of work possible for each group, as well as total cost for the oversight of
contract employees. Contractors offer the opportunity to upsurge very quickly to provide skills
necessary to support the mission. After the mission is complete, they are able to down-scope
just as easily. There has been much discussion that contractors are more skilled in their areas
of expertise, but the quality of output is difficult to measure as there is such a difference of the
scope of work that can be performed. Contractors cannot perform “inherently governmental
functions” as specified by Circular A-76. This greatly limits the scope of work that private
military contractors can perform.
Outsourcing is important in public policy and administration, as it affects almost every
government agency and all taxpayers who are hoping their money is being spent as efficiently
as possible. While my interests lie within the Department of Defense, the findings from my
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study should have universal implications for any federal agency using contractor services. As
discussed previously, a large percentage of contractors are used by the Department of Defense,
but other agencies such as the Department of Energy use contractors as well. Data on civil
service and contractor pay as well as the inherently governmental functions limiting the scope
of contractors work will remain steady regardless of the federal agency reviewed for the
positions included in this study. The civil service pay scales are the same regardless of agency,
therefore the government pay will remain the same. The Government Services Administration
allows for contracts from any government agency looking to utilize that service. Inherently
governmental functions apply to all contractors as designated in the Circular A-76, so regardless
of agency or department, the same limitations will be addressed. I focus on contractor
personnel and government civilian personnel. This issue is at the forefront of the current
administration’s agenda, as President Obama has been pushing for a decrease in contractor
personnel within all agencies of the federal government, including defense (Zwerdling 2009).
President Obama feels that it is in the best interest of taxpayers to provide better regulations
and more control over the procurement process, and one step in this direction is to decrease
the number of contractors in positions that could be filled by civilian personnel (Zwerdling
2009). The United States is facing a growing national debt. The Debt Held by the Public is
currently at $8.3 trillion, which is nearly 58% of Gross Domestic Product (US Department of the
Treasury 2010; US Debt Clock 2010). This measure, and its expected increase over the next few
years, can lead one to believe that the country is currently in a dire situation financially. The
annual budget for the Department of Defense is pushing closer to $700 billion, as one of the
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largest budget items, which leads to the question of how important cost savings are to the
military and how outsourcing affects a recovery from the current financial crisis.

III.

LITERATURE REVIEW

History of Outsourcing

Throughout the history of the United States, there have always been contractor
personnel to ensure that all jobs are filled. Contractors within the Department of Defense are
brought in for various reasons, including the quality of output, experience provided, and the
political access that is often gained through military or civil service experience. This political
access is often beneficial in the Department of Defense as retirees have knowledge,
connections and strong working relationships with customers that new civil service employees
lack. Many military retirees provide the contracting industry with high quality individuals who
are highly knowledgeable on the ways of government (Adams 1981). The Department of
Defense budget includes $158.3 billion for contracts (Government Accountability Office 2008).
This constitutes over 70% of all federal government contract spending. Not all, but some of this
grant money is in turn spent on contractors at the state and local level. Based on these data,
DoD is the best agency to look at when considering the overall cost efficiency of contractors
due to the high levels of contract spending (Government Accountability Office 2010). While the
Department of Defense is unique in that they are responsible for providing security for our
country, they still use many of the same contractors used government wide. Many private
contractors are not tied directly to one agency. Instead they will work in any branch they are
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awarded a contract. This contributes to the ability to draw from research in other organizations
and agencies as to the cost efficiency of hiring private contractors.
Some citizens are concerned about the ability of the Department of Defense to utilize
contractors to the full extent that it can utilize government civilian personnel. Regulations must
be strictly adhered to and neither contractors nor government can work outside of these
guidelines. The Circular A-76 that is produced by the Office of Management and Budget
establishes federal policy for the competition of commercial activities. This circular’s mandate
is to “ensure that the American people receive maximum value for their tax dollars, commercial
activities should be subject to the forces of competition” (Office of Management and Budget
2003). This policy is believed to encourage competition for both government and contractors in
order to have the greatest efficiency by developing new technologies for the production
process. According to Circular A-76, all activities can either be performed in-house or they can
be outsourced, but it must be the most cost efficient means of producing the good or service
necessary.
Also related to outsourcing and competition provided by the contractors and
commercial sector, is the idea of “inherently governmental” functions. “An inherently
governmental activity is an activity that is so intimately related to the public interest as to
mandate performance by government personnel…governmental activities normally fall into two
categories: the exercise of sovereign government authority or the establishment of procedures
and processes related to the oversight of monetary transactions or entitlement” (Office of
Management and Budget 2003). Due to these “inherently governmental” functions, there are
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many positions within the Department of Defense in which contractors would be unable to
serve in a fully functional capacity. This would include positions such as finance and contracting
where there are obligations made on behalf of the government. In order to have support
contractors in these roles, there must be government personnel working alongside the support
contractors who would serve as signature authority and oversight for those private military
contractors. However, a recent GAO study of contractor contract specialists has revealed some
problems associated with the Inherently Governmental Functions. This report states that many
contractors are not identifying themselves as a private contractor, which could lead some
government personnel to believe they have certain authority. These types of actions can often
lead to confusion and problems as the line separating contractor from government can get
blurry at times. (Government Accountability Office 2008).
The military is often driven to use more contractors than other agencies due to the
nature of an all volunteer force. Many contractors are willing to go where they are needed,
which leads to a much greater utilization of the private workforce. Camm (1966) addresses
privatization from a view prior to the Global War on Terror. According to Camm, there needs to
be a focus from the Department of Defense on the “core activities” for government personnel,
while contractors could fill in gaps outside of these core capabilities (Camm 1996). These core
activities would likely be considered those positions intertwined with inherently governmental
functions. According to Camm, these core activities should remain with civil service employees,
but others could be outsourced and gain some efficiency. There should be an analysis done to
ensure that the positions outsourced are compatible with the Department of Defense goals by
ensuring there is little risk involved and that contracting that position is feasible. By decreasing
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risk and still striving to reach the goals of the Department of Defense, contracting could
increase efficiency.
Privatization of the government is a phenomenon that seems to come in spurts, as
stated by Boyne. The Department of Defense is no exception to this rule, as many of the spurts
are in concurrence with international conflicts as is currently the situation. According to Boyne,
many previous studies have misconstrued data in order to achieve the desired outcome of
contractors being the most cost efficient. While this may or may not be the case, he seems to
attribute this phenomenon to “management fads” (Boyne 1998). These management fads, as
related to private contractors, can be traced back to goals and ideals of the current
administration. The Clinton/Gore administration made a massive cut to the federal workforce.
The Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994 states there should be no increase in service
contracts unless cost comparison demonstrates it would be beneficial to the federal
government (Seidman 1998). However, there continues to be increases in contractor
personnel, and the percentage of civilian personnel continues to shrink. President Obama is
currently focused on a different management fad of bulking up the opportunities available
within the federal government, and decreasing the number of positions outsourced.
Management fads are the main driving factors in the way outsourcing is handled, starting with
the President and his administration. This idea is vital in how management trends arise and
how to reverse those trends if necessary.
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Is contractor oversight efficient?
A driving factor for the federal government to enter into contracting is to ensure the
work is being done to the highest standard and quality possible. The government acts as the
oversight agent for all contracts within any department or agency, as all cabinet-level
departments have mechanisms for the oversight of contractors. In the case of the Department
of Defense, it is the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) that is responsible for auditing each
contract that the federal government has authorized. “The Defense Contract Audit Agency
(DCAA) is responsible for providing audit services and financial advice to all Department of
Defense (DoD) acquisition officials to assist them in achieving fair and reasonable contract
prices and assuring compliance with contractual terms and conditions” ( Defense Contract
Audit Agency 2009). During this process, they are required to look over all financial information
for any project performed by a private military contractor. This includes all payments made by
the customer, and the efficiency with which the main contractor executes the requirements of
the contract.
However, there has been some concern as to the quality of oversight provided by DCAA.
The GAO recently conducted a study to ensure that DCAA is properly reviewing all contracts in a
timely manner so that taxpayer money is spent in the most efficient manner possible. A
widespread audit of the DCAA led the GAO to discover that there were serious problems that
leave billions of taxpayer dollars vulnerable to fraud. “Of the 69 audits and cost-related
assignments GAO reviewed, 65 exhibited serious deficiencies that rendered them unreliable for
decisions on contract awards, management and oversight” (Government Accountability Office
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2009). These deficiencies were a result the following issues: lack of independence, insufficient
testing, unsupported opinions, production environment and audit quality issues, and issues of
timeliness. Allowing these deficiencies within the contracting process enables contractors to
take advantage of the situation through many different ways and means. Recently a US Army
Colonel has admitted to accepting over $50,000 in bribes from a defense contractor in Iraq that
offered him/her a job after retirement in return for awarding an $8.2 million weapons
warehousing contract (Millman, 2010). This not only contributes to the fear of mismanagement
of funds among contractors, but can lead to corruption among those awarding the contracts.
This makes the billions of dollars put into the Department of Defense contracting dependent
upon the honesty and integrity of contractors, who may or may not take advantage of poor
oversight. These issues bring to light the fact that there are billions of dollars that are not being
audited and accounted for in a timely manner. The FY10 Budget projections for DCAA total
$458,316,000 to include all personnel costs and any other cost ( Defense Contract Audit Agency
2009).
Also involved in contract oversight is the Defense Contract Management Agency
(DCMA). The responsibilities for DCMA include providing contract administration services,
acquisition management services, quality assurance, along with ensuring the integrity of
Department of Defense contracts (Defense Contract Management Agency 2009). Below is the
current layout of the number of civilians employed by DCMA to ensure that the services
contracted out to support the warfighter are of the highest quality. The approximately 10,000
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civilian employees with DCMA manage over 300,000 prime contracts1 around the world. This
information was not explicitly stated for DCAA, but the organizations are managing the same
contracts, so figures should be accurate for both agencies.

DCAA Roles and
Responsibilities

DCMA Roles and
Responsibilities

Audit Services for DoD
Financial Advice to DoD
Monitor Cost Performance

Contract Management Services
Life-cycle Acquisition support
Ensuring the integrity of the
government contracting process

Review and Approve Contract
Payments

Quality assurance for shipments
received overseas and those sent
out from contractors across the
world

Review of Forward Pricing Rates:
Contract Administration Services
Overhead costs, rates placed on all
to include reviewing payments
costs to cover the cost of business.
and contract closeout.
( Defense Contract Audit Agency 2009) (Defense Contract Management Agency 2009)
DCMA Agency Data (12/31/09)
Number of Civilians

10,115

Number of Military

514

Number of Districts

6

Number of Field Offices

48

Number of Active Contracts

322,183

1

“Prime contract” means a contract or contractual action entered into by the United States for the
purpose of obtaining supplies, materials, equipment, or services of any kind FAR 3.502-1 (United States
Government n.d.)
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The Inspector General provides oversight for the contracting offices throughout the
Department of Defense. The DoD Inspector General provides investigative, audit, and general
oversight services for the Department of Defense. They will often act in a similar role as DCMA
and DCAA for the government personnel administering these contracts. Based on a recent
study of the organization, the IG is requesting new positions due to the increase in
requirements including: audit, investigation, policy & oversight, and administration
(Department of Defense Inspector General 2008). The DoD IG Growth plan addresses the
overarching need for personnel in the current environment. The Department of Defense
budget has increased from $200 Billion to a FY 2011 budget request of $712.1 billion since the
start of the Global War on Terror (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) 2010).
This has put a significant strain on those individuals responsible for ensuring that tax payer
dollars are being spent wisely and efficiently.
Utilization of Work Force

There are many factors that affect the readiness of any branch within the Department of
Defense. After the Cold War, there was the push to move towards a leaner federal
government, which led to massive cuts in the standing military and an increase in outsourcing.
This has really increased pressure on the Active Duty and Ready Reserve forces since
September 11, 2001. According to the 2007 demographic data for the Department of Defense,
since 1990, there has been approximately 33% decrease in troop strength (Department of
Defense n.d.). Many of the remaining units have been deployed multiple times which can
increase stress not only on the military personnel but on their families as well. Due to this
decrease, there has been a greater reliance on contractor personnel.
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Number of Military Personnel

2,500,000

Military Workforce

2,000,000
1990

1,500,000

1995
1,000,000

2000
2005

500,000

2006
0

2007
Army

Navy

Marine
Corps

Air Force Total DoD

Branch of Service

Table 1. DoD Active Duty Trends: 1990-2007

Military Workforce
Year
1990
1995
2000
2005
2006
2007

Army
Navy
Marine Corps
Air Force
728,345
573,737
196,353
530,865
504,710
429,630
174,561
396,382
479,026
367,371
172,955
351,326
486,483
357,853
179,836
349,362
502,790
345,098
180,252
344,529
517,783
332,269
186,425
329,094
Source: From Military Home Front, “2007 Demographics Report”

Total DoD
2,029,300
1,505,283
1,370,678
1,373,534
1,372,669
1,365,571

2010 DoD Civilian Workforce
Appropriated
Non-Appropriated Funds
Total Civilian Workforce
759,013
134,570
893,583

Source: DoD Civilian Personnel Management Service
However, the comparable costs have not been altered significantly as one might
imagine. There have been significant cuts in personnel but Operations and Maintenance
(O&M) funds have increased (Harris 2006). Military personnel funds are used to pay the
salaries, benefits, and bonuses for all members of the uniform services. Operations and
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Maintenance funds are used for civilian pay as well as day-to-day operating expenses.
Contracts fall under many different funding areas, depending on the requirement. However,
any operations support activity provided by a contractor would be considered O&M funds
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 2009). This
could lead us to question whether this outsourcing is in fact saving the US Government funds as
is commonly believed.
There must also be consideration of what type of work can be performed by civilians, or
contractors. According to the CBO, “military commanders have less direct authority over the
actions of contractor personnel than over their military or civilian government subordinates.
Contractors’ duties are set out in their contract, which is managed by a government contracting
officer, not the military commander” (Congressional Budget Office 2008). This can cause
problems, when there is not a guaranteed cooperation with the needs at the time. Having to
work within the bounds of a contract can limit the effectiveness of the contractors, while their
government civilian counterparts can work outside the specified job descriptions with all other
duties as assigned. This inability to work outside the contract limits the effectiveness that the
contractors have in the field and at home.
Flexibility of the Work Force
There has been drastic down scope in the size of the standing military in order to create
a leaner, more cost efficient government. Due to this down scope, during times of conflict,
there is a need to have a surge force, which is typically seen as the ready reserve forces of the
Reserves and National Guard. However, when National Guard and Reserves units are being
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deployed multiple times, where are the surge forces to come from? Private military contractors
can surge up to as large a force as necessary to support the war fighter. They can provide some
security forces, but much of the contingency force includes professionals in fields such as
acquisition and information technology that are addressed in this paper. “Perhaps the
greatest strength of the private military contractor is the inherent flexibility they offer in form
of surge support… In theory, contracted firms do not need a large permanent staff and when a
job ends; they can quickly reduce much of their workforce” (Harris 2006). When the war is over,
the contractors can drastically decrease in force size if necessary. While they can surge
internationally, they can also do the same domestically. When military personnel are deployed,
contractors can fill in both at home and abroad. This is beneficial as troop forces have been
decreased considerably.
While the surge capability is great, the down-scoping is just as vital. Once the mission is
complete, contractors can decrease force as quickly as they surged. This is a huge cost saving
mechanism, as there is no commitment on behalf of the government once the job is done.
Government civilians cannot be cut back as easily. Due to a surge in funding and contracts
awarded, the Defense Acquisition University 2 states that it can often be vital to use contractors
in such situations. However, there should be an appropriate mix of contractors to government
personnel even in surge situations (Government Accountability Office 2008). This leads to a
greater long term cost for the government, which must be taken into consideration. Due to the
nature of war, it is difficult to measure the cost efficiency of contractors at the beginning of a
2

The Defense Acquisition University is a corporate university for the Defense Acquisition Workforce. This
organization provides training for acquisition personnel in all stages of their career to include formal courses,
continuous learning, knowledge sharing assets, and consulting. DAU is the training and certification force for all
Defense Acquisition personnel.
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conflict. Another issue with the down-scope to consider is the drastic difference between those
working overseas and those working domestically. Again, much of the research is based on
contractors abroad, which leads me to question if the same is true domestically.
Transaction Cost
In the end, it is important to realize that contractors are corporations that are in the
business to make a profit. Without profit, organizations would not be able to survive in a
competitive market economy. The government acknowledges that profit is not a bad thing and
that those companies that are providing services in the form of contracts should receive a
reasonable profit in order to stay in business. When addressing what transaction cost is
acceptable there are three levels of analysis to include: the overall structure of the enterprise,
the operating parts, and lastly, how the human assets are organized (Williamson 1981).
According to Williamson’s theory of transaction costs, people are subject to “bounded
rationality” but pursue their self-interest with guile. The government can safeguard against foul
play by ensuring that there is adequate competition. Competition will invoke the law of natural
selection as those companies looking for profit maximization will lose contracts to companies
that are able to provide the same services with a more reasonable profit margin. There is a
distinction among those contractors looking for exorbitant profits compared to those seeking
sustainability. By adhering to the ideal requirements of obtaining competition, the government
will receive the lowest prices.
Another point of interest in transaction cost regards the asset or location specificity
(Williamson 1981). If there is a market that requires highly specific investments, it becomes
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more of a bilateral agreement between the organizations so that it benefits both to continue
the arrangement. This specificity could lead to an alteration in cost in any given market;
therefore, that could be taken into consideration when studying cost effectiveness. However,
this will not be incorporated into cost effectiveness in this study because contract specialists
and system administrators can use their knowledge outside the Department of Defense as well;
in other words, their asset specificity is low compared to nuclear weapons engineers, for
example.

IV.

RESEARCH DESIGN

This research is focused on determining the most cost efficient method of providing
support services within the Department of Defense by comparing private military contractors
and government civilian personnel. The first issue to address is the annual cost, including
annual compensation and all benefits, including healthcare, paid time off, and retirement
contributions. In order to get an accurate measure of this, I select two job titles that have a
significant number of employees both in the civilian and contractor realm: contract specialists
and system administrators. Contract specialists are very important members of the
procurement community, and they are prevalent on both the private and government side.
Contract specialists’ functionality in the private sector is limited due to inherently governmental
functions. The effect of the limited functions is discussed below. This research also reviews
information technology professionals, specifically system administrators that do not have as
many restrictions as to what they can do. The systems administrators are a great occupation to
study due to fewer limitations based on inherently governmental functions discussed below.
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By using both these fields, I believe there is a good balance to make a fair judgment on
costs. In order to get an accurate comparison, I examine contractor’s information from the
Government Services Administration, including hourly cost to the government (this includes
salary, benefits, overhead to include administrative and management positions, profit for
contractor) and basic requirements to qualify for such a position. I use several contractor
estimates for the Lexington, KY area, and base government personnel salary in Lexington, KY as
well. In order to estimate benefits for the government personnel, I use the benefits wizard
provided by www.salary.com. The benefits wizard can be used based on industry. Due to the
fact that I do not look at a specific organization, this will give an accurate estimate for the
benefits received. I use a high and low estimate in order to get a more accurate picture. The
high and low estimates are used based on the limitations of www.salary.com. This source
provides estimates in the government sector and is the best source to use due to the wide
variety of benefits to include pension/thrift savings, healthcare plans, and paid time off based
on length of service. There are a broad range of outcomes and using www.salary.com factors in
many of those variables to get the most accurate estimate.
Another factor vital to this research is the level of oversight for both private military
contractors and government civilian personnel. The Defense Contract Audit Agency and the
Defense Contract Management Agency provide oversight for private military contractors. This
includes reviewing projects to ensure billing, accounting and inventory systems are properly
run. DCMA is available for more quality assurance roles to ensure what is promised to the
customer is what is being produced. This area is reviewed more broadly as an overall cost to
the Department of Defense to provide these services. According to DOD reports, DCMA and
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DCAA are responsible for managing over 324,000 active contracts. There have been a few GAO
reports regarding the effectiveness of DCAA and whether taxpayer dollars are being spent
properly. The civil service oversight organization that is comparable to these agencies is the
DOD Inspector General. Budget information has been gathered for comparison. By comparing
annual budgets of DCAA, DCMA and the DOD IG in accordance with the current contract
requirements, data are analyzed in regard to cost and efficiency.
Inherently governmental functions, which are actions that cannot be performed by
contract personnel, are specified in OMB Circular A-76. This federal government document
states what actions would be seen in breach of US Code. One such illegal action would be for
contractor personnel to obligate the government to any service or any payment. This legal
restriction severely limits contractors in areas such as contracting and finance. Contractor
personnel will never be able to perform these functions, which means there must always be
government personnel to oversee and sign any required paperwork to get the job done.
Inherently governmental functions affect Contract Specialists and Systems Administrators very
differently. Contract specialists are limited in their ability to consult with government and
contractor personnel. Due to the inability to obligate the government contractually, they
cannot task other contractors or government personnel in order to get a contract awarded.
Government civilian contract specialists are eligible to receive a warrant, while contractor
contracting specialists are not. In essence the private contract specialists assist the government
personnel by preparing documents for signature, reviewing proposals for cost reasonableness,
and providing assistance in the procurement process without the ability to agree to anything.
Without a government counterpart, the contractor contract specialist cannot function fully in
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this role. System Administrators on the other hand can fully function as their positions are
minimally affected by inherently governmental functions. They again cannot obligate the
government, but they can serve in a technical role daily as a fully functioning System
Administrator without requiring a government counterpart. In light of these requirements,
would a job be more efficiently done in its entirety by government rather than partially by
contractor personnel with government oversight?
In my review of the evidence I look at annual cost and DCAA/DCMA costs compared to
the DOD Inspector General costs. I also discuss the inherently governmental functions and
scope of work based on previous literature. After gathering all this information, I compare
costs accumulated and then conclude which personnel type provides the most bang for the
governments buck.

V.

DATA REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

ANNUAL GOVERNMENT COST
I obtained government civilian pay rates on the website for the Office of Personnel
Management. This website provides only the salary rate, not the rate paid for benefits. In order
to best estimate the cost of benefits for government employees, I looked at salary.com which
allows one to estimate total benefit costs based on salary rate. The benefits included on this
website are 401k/403b/Pension, Social Security, Disability, Healthcare, and time off and other.
When estimating benefit coverage in addition to annual compensation, a few
assumptions have been made based on OPM standards. With the current retirement system,
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there is a thrift savings match of 5%. Therefore I kept 5% standard on both the high and low
estimate. I used industry standard costs for the health insurance and disability for the high
standard, and decreased them to 0 for the low estimate for those employees that do not take
advantage of health care plans. The new retirement system is based in the thrift savings plan,
so pension is not considered in the estimate. The Federal Employee Retirement System
became mandatory in 1984, which means that everyone entering the federal workforce over
the last 26 years (over 70%) is part of this thrift savings based system compared to the previous
pension system. Lastly, for the high estimate of paid time off, there is a total of 43 days as that
is the maximum that any federal employee can get including sick leave and vacation leave. The
minimum to be received by any federal employee is 26 days including sick leave and vacation
leave. These figures were used for the high and low estimates respectively.
Contract Specialists: All of the data gathered from GSA required mid-level experience, which
has led me to choose the equivalent pay grade in the civilian service as a Grade 12. Grade
twelve is considered a mid-career grade within federal service. I looked at the pay rates at
www.opm.gov with a locality rate increase for the Kentucky area. According to these data, the
annual compensation for a GS-12 employee is $71,455 (Office of Personnel Management).
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Contract Specialist (GS-12) Total Cost Estimate
Benefit Coverage Estimate

Costs

High Estimate (Full Coverage)

$97,222.00

Low Estimate (Partial Coverage)

$87,639.00

Average Costs

$92,430.50

Source: Salary.com: Benefits Wizard
System Administrators: Data gathered from the Government Services Administration page for
system administrator costs for government contractors was based on low/entry-level in their
career. Most required an Associate’s degree, if any education was required, and approximately
4-6 years experience in the field. Due to this I compare these systems administrators to a GS-9.
After reviewing current openings with the federal government as systems administrators, most
fell into the GS-7 to GS-11 range, so I use the GS-9 for my estimate (USAJOBS.com). Annual
compensation at the GS-9 level in the Kentucky area is $49,273.
System Administrator (GS-9) Total Cost Estimate
Benefit Coverage Estimate

Costs

High Estimate (Full Coverage)

$70,889.00

Low Estimate (Partial Coverage)

$60,433.00

Average Costs

$65,661.00

Source: Salary.com: Benefits Wizard
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ANNUAL CONTRACTOR COST
In order to get an accurate cost on contractors in these fields, I gathered data by
systematic random sampling based on the specific schedules with GSA for each career field.
GSA has the capability to create an excel spreadsheet with the names of all contractors under
that schedule. I used a systematic random sample to choose 20 contractors and used their
hourly rates for contract specialist or their equivalent. Due to the fact that some companies did
not offer a job title of contract/procurement specialist, the numbers were randomly generated
until 20 contractor’s rates were found. I used a random number generator website
(www.random.org) as well as the excel spreadsheets produced by GSA. The GSA schedule for
contract specialist equivalencies is 874-6 (Acquisition Management Support). Below is the
information for this career field as listed with GSA.
Acquisition Management Support Contractors shall provide professional support services
to agencies in conducting federal acquisition management activities. Services covered by
this Schedule number are: acquisition planning assistance, including market research and
recommending procurement strategy: acquisition document development, including
cost/price estimates, quality assurance surveillance plans, statements of work, synopses,
solicitations, price negotiation memoranda, etc.: expert assistance in supporting proposal
evaluations, including price/cost analysis or technical proposal analysis: contract
administration support services, including assistance with reviewing contractor
performance, developing contract modifications, and investigating reports of contract
discrepancies: contract close-out assistance; Competitive Sourcing support, including OMB
Circular A-76 studies, strategic sourcing studies, privatization studies, public-private
partnerships, and Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act studies. Inherently
Governmental services as identified in FAR 7.503 or by the ordering agency are prohibited
under MOBIS. It is the responsibility of the Contracting Officer placing the order to make
this determination. Ordering activities must require prospective contractors to identify
potential conflicts of interest and address those, prior to task order award. For more
information, see www.gsa.gov/mobis.
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CONTRACT SPECIALIST CONTRACTOR RATES
CONTRACTOR NAME

RATE/HOUR

Abacus Technology Corporation

$80.12

Alliance Consulting Corporation

$103.03

B3 Solutions, LLC

$98.43

Business Strategy Consultants

$89.64

CACI INC Federal

$86.47

Capstone Corporation

$69.42

Centre Consulting, INC

$126.00

CH2M Hill, INC

$125.74

Comprehensive Enterprise Solutions, LLC

$148.80

Enterprise Solutions Group, INC.

$148.80

Federal Acquisition Resources IN

$86.14

Fox Systems

$151.05

Government Contract Solutions, INC

$72.79

Key Management Partners, INC

$84.87

Martek Global Services, INC

$73.89

Pangea INC

$71.71

Phacil, INC

$95.96

Procurevis, INC

$62.61

Stratecon LLC

$136.38

Your Recruiting Company, INC

$74.73

AVERAGE

$93.33

Based on the information gathered from GSA, the average hourly rate for a system
administrator is $93.33. These hourly rates include compensation, benefits, profit for the
company, general and administrative costs in order to come to a total cost for the government.
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I have calculated annual costs based on a forty hour work week, 52 weeks per year. This gives a
grand annual total of $194,126.40.
Also reviewed is the GSA IT Schedule 70 132-51 (Information Technology Professional
Services) which listed 3,754 contractors that provide contracts for these types of services.
Below is the GSA description of this career field schedule.
Information Technology Professional Services - SUBJECT TO COOPERATIVE
PURCHASING Includes resources and facilities management, database planning and
design, systems analysis and design, network services, programming, millennium on
version services, conversion and implementation support, network services project
management, data/records management, subscriptions/publications (electronic media),
and other services.
Information for system administrators was gathered in the same method as that of the
contract specialists listed previously. Similar to the contract specialists, there were some
contractors that do not offer a system administrator career field. The rates were gathered
randomly with the random number generator and the GSA produced spreadsheet until rates for
20 contractors were obtained.
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SYSTEMS ADMINISTRATOR CONTRACTOR RATES
CONTRACTOR NAME

RATE/HOUR

Aligned Development Strategies, Inc

$93.42

APM, LLC

$107.70

AVUM, Inc

$74.02

BNL, Inc

$90.00

Cambridge Systems Inc

$60.42

CHAASH, Inc

$114.00

COACT, Inc

$119.50

DATAVISE

$68.40

DSG Systems Inc

$79.00

MDB Inc

$116.15

Mind Over Machines, Inc

$71.30

MYSTICAL SOLUTIONS , LLC

$72.11

Northrop Grumman Space & Mission

$81.85

PMG Global Corporation

$85.00

Provista Software INTL, Inc

$133.08

Sapphire Technologies, LP

$87.79

Senior Consultants Inc

$72.73

Technodyne LLC

$134.00

V2Soft Inc

$51.29

Worldwide Technologies, INC

$118.45

AVERAGE

$91.51

Based on the information gathered from GSA, the average hourly rate for a system
administrator is $91.51. These hourly rates include compensation, benefits, profit for the
company, general and administrative costs in order to come to a total cost for the government.
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I have calculated annual costs based on a forty hour work week, 52 weeks per year. This gives a
grand annual total of $190,340.80.

250,000.00

Annual Cost Summary

Annual Salary

200,000.00
150,000.00
100,000.00

Contractor Cost
Government Cost

50,000.00
0.00
System
Administrator

Contract Specialist

Career Field

As depicted in the graph above, there are significant cost increases for contractor
personnel compared to civil service personnel. However, there are factors that increase the
value of contractor personnel for the government. While they are not quantified, they must be
considered since there are such drastic cost differences. The factors to be considered are:
•

Flexibility of the Workforce: What value does the government receive by having the
ability to quickly reduce force when no longer needed? By having the ability to downscope quickly, it could drastically reduce lifetime costs for the government even if short
term costs may be higher. Below is a seven year estimate for contractors and
government civilians. Both calculations factor in varying cost of living increases, while
the government personnel promotion rate is also varied in order to show just how
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complex this calculation is to get an accurate picture of what could happen to lifetime
costs.
5 Year Estimate of Total Cost (No Promotion/ Low Cost of Living 3) Government

Pay Grade

Step

Salary

COL Increase

Total Salary
with COL
Increase

Year 1

12

1

$71,455

0

$71,455

$95,250

Year 2

12

2

$73,836

1%

$74,574

$99,129

Year 3

12

3

$76,218

1%

$77,742

$103,068

Year 4

12

4

$78,600

1%

$80,958

$107,067

Year 5

12

4

$78,600

1%

$81,744

$109,617

Year 6

12

5

$80,982

1%

$85,031

$113,767

Year 7

12

5

$80,982

1%

$85,841

$114,790

Total Compensation

$742,688
5 Year Estimate of Total Cost (Promotion/High Cost of Living) Government

Pay Grade

Step

Salary

COL Increase

Total Salary
with COL
Increase

Year 1

12

1

$71,455

0

$71,455

$95,250

Year 2

12

2

$73,836

3%

$76,051

$100,966

Year 3

13

1

$84,970

3%

$90,068

$118,395

Year 4

13

2

$87,802

3%

$95,704

$125,404

Year 5

14

1

$100,408

3%

$112,457

$148,049

Year 6

14

2

$103,755

3%

$119,318

$156,016

Year 7

14

3

$107,102

3%

$126,380

$164,765

TOTAL

Total Compensation

$908,845

3

Cost of living increases are determined based upon Consumer Prices Index which is a program that produces
monthly data on changes in the prices paid by urban consumers for a representative basket of goods and services
(United States Department of Labor 2010).
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5 Year Contractor Estimate (Low Cost of Living Increase)

Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Year 6
Year 7
TOTAL

Hourly Rate Annual Salary
$93.33
$194,126.40
$93.33
$194,126.40
$93.33
$194,126.40
$93.33
$194,126.40
$93.33
$194,126.40
$93.33
$194,126.40
$93.33
$194,126.40

COL
Increase
0%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%

Total Compensation
$194,126
$196,068
$198,009
$199,950
$201,891
$203,833
$207,715
$1,401,592

5 Year Contractor Estimate (High Cost of Living Increase)

Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Year 6
Year 7
TOTAL

•

Hourly Rate Annual Salary
$93.33
$194,126.40
$93.33
$194,126.40
$93.33
$194,126.40
$93.33
$194,126.40
$93.33
$194,126.40
$93.33
$194,126.40
$93.33
$194,126.40

COL
Increase
0%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%

Total Compensation
$194,126
$199,950
$205,774
$211,598
$217,422
$223,245
$229,069
$1,481,185

The tables above are calculations of possible scenarios for contract specialists based on
similar assumptions as previously used during the estimate. As shown above, there are
many factors that affect the lifetime costs, and it would take more research to get an
accurate picture of lifetime costs. The Cost Price Index that controls the annual cost of
living increase each year can really make a difference in the total cost. Another thing to
factor in is what if the contractors are down-scoped after 3 years? This is where the
flexibility of the contractor could be valuable to the government. With so many factors,
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it would be interesting to see if there is a true cost savings at some point in the
outsourcing process. The chart below demonstrates the cost savings to the
government with a contractor down-scope after 3 years of service. The total cost of the
civilian employee exceeds that of the contractor in year 6. This chart is based on low
cost of living increases (1% annually) and no promotion for both individuals, which is the
first estimate for the government and contractor in the above charts. The contractor
provides cost savings to the government after a down-scope only if there is no
productive purpose for the government civilian beyond the task(s) the contractor
performed in the three year period prior to down-scope.

Government vs. Contractor Cost
Total Compiled Cost Per Year

(With and Without Contractor Down-scope)
$1,600,000
$1,400,000
$1,200,000
$1,000,000
$800,000
$600,000
$400,000
$200,000
$0

7 year Government Cost
7 Year Contractor Cost
Contractor Cost After 3
year Layoff
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Year

•

Productivity of the Workforce: If a study was conducted on the productivity of the
contractor workforce in comparison to the civilian workforce, there could be higher
productivity that would decrease overall costs. According to Houseman (2007),
productivity is very difficult to measure. However, based on economic theory,
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productivity growth should lead to increased wages for those laborers (Houseman
2007). While Houseman focused on manufacturing, the same principles apply for
contractors in the US and working around the world. The idea that increased
productivity leads to increased wages could explain such a significant increase in overall
costs for contractors. If a private contractor can produce twice the work in the same
amount of time as a government civilian, this would increase the cost effectiveness of
using contractors. By determining what a productivity gain consists of for each function
(e.g. for contract specialists and system technicians), one would be able to determine
the productivity gained by using contractors vs. civilian employees. The idea of
productivity gains can be used to explain the increased cost for contractors as shown
above. It takes six years for a civilian to surpass the three years of contractors salaries.
If the contractor was at least twice as productive as the government civilian, for a threeyear long task it would always be more efficient to hire the contractor because for the
government civilian it would take six years, the total cost of which would be greater
than the total cost of the contractor who gets down-scoped at the end of the task.
•

Inherently Governmental Functions: Systems Administrators have a greater difference
in pay than contract specialists from the private to government role. This could be
attributed to the ability of contracted system administrators to fully function in their
roles, which would increase their value.

•

Skills: While the government requirements are comparable to the contractor
requirements for employment in these positions, there could be an increase in the skill
level of contractor personnel. As discussed in the literature review, one benefit of
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contractors is that many of them are retired military or civil service employees that have
extensive experience. While there could be a decrease in skills, this is very uncommon
as many contractors are retired military or civil service, especially in the procurement
field.
OVERSIGHT COSTS
AGENCY
Defense Contract Management Agency
Defense Contract Audit Agency
Department of Defense-Inspector General

ANNUAL BUDGET
$1,058,721,000.00

$458,316,000.00
$288,100,000.00

Cost per Contract
$3,286.09
$1,422.53
$894.21

Source: DCAA Annual Budget, DCMA Annual Budget, DOD IG Growth Plan
As discussed in the literature review, each agency plays an integral role in Department
of Defense Acquisition. The government is currently managing 322,183 active contracts, which
not only require the employees in the procurement office, but also the oversight agencies.
DCAA and DCMA are both responsible for overseeing contractor’s activities, while the DOD-IG is
responsible for the procurement offices issuing the contracts. These contracts include both
international and domestic agreements. However, there do not seem to be any accurate data
available on the number of contractors currently working with the Department of Defense,
therefore I am looking at a per contract cost for each agency. There have been requests from all
agencies for additional funding along with additional personnel. This suggests that taxpayer
dollars are vulnerable to fraud and mismanagement as previously reported. The GAO report
previously reviewed addresses the DCAA issues, and these per contract costs for each agency
seem very low. The other oversight agencies may have deficiencies, and this is a subject that
could be addressed with future research. There is a drastic increase in the oversight costs for
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those agencies looking at contractor’s systems compared to those looking over the activities of
the civil service employees.
In response to the GAO report that stated that DCAA was putting billions of taxpayer
dollars at risk of fraud, waste, and mismanagement, there have been drastic policy changes
within the agency. Prior to the new policy, auditors had the option to report deficiencies
discovered as inadequate in part. New policy only allows for a pass/fail option, and failure
leads to serious repercussions for those organizations. Along with the pass/fail change, there
will also be no suggestions in the audit reports to improve any deficiencies (Saccoccia 2008). If
these issues are not adequately addressed, at the time of failure DCAA will inform the
Contracting Officer to suspend payments on any accounts that may be affected. This could be
detrimental to the success of the contractor.

VI.

Recommendations/Conclusion

This research set out with the goal of determining cost effectiveness in relation to
federal government contracting, specifically within the Department of Defense. After reviewing
literature in this field, it is apparent that there are many different factors that impact the
effectiveness of contractors in support of the federal government. While this study is not
comprehensive due to so many variables, it addresses total cost of employment and looks at
the adequacy of oversight for federal contracts. Based on the analysis of data and literature on
the topic, recommendations are made.
Based on total employment cost of private military contractors as compared to
government civilian personnel, the government personnel are the lowest cost to the
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government if each employee is considered a regular employee. Therefore, the best hiring
option for the government is to hire civilian personnel to fulfill these organizational needs.
While there is a large difference in cost, hiring decisions should be determined based on
the individual needs of the agency as to the efficiency that is gained by using contractors as
opposed to government civilians. These determinations would be based on length of service in
correlation with the customer requirements. Within the Department of Defense, it is up to the
military customers to submit their needs for the contractor to provide services. These
requirements can vary in length and complexity. If a short term project is required, it could be
beneficial to hire a contractor as opposed to civilian personnel due to the flexibility of their
positions. Presidential administrations will often be the deciding authority for the utilization of
contractors. Management fads exist with each administration as has been shown the past, and
this will continue to be a major factor in the future.
Future research could address lifetime costs for a “permanent” contractor position as
compared to a civil service employee. This calculation would involve many factors and many
assumptions including the length of service, promotion rate, cost of living increases, discount
rate, retirement benefits, healthcare benefits after service. This would require multiple
estimates in order to get best case, worst case and likely scenarios. At the current rates, it takes
about two years of government pay to catch up to one year of contractor costs. Private military
contractors supporting the Department of Defense domestically are less likely than those
serving overseas to be down-scoped rapidly. Contractors often serve in more permanent
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positions domestically (Government Accountability Office 2008). Based on current trends in
the workforce, contractors seem to be the more costly option.
There is a dire need for more efficient oversight of Department of Defense contracts.
DCAA, DCMA, and DOD-IG are responsible for serving as the oversight body on contracts
currently awarded. However, each agency has requested additional full time employees in
order to meet the increasing requirements. Without the increase in personnel as requested,
taxpayer dollars will remain vulnerable to fraud, waste and mismanagement. This finding has
been the most eye-opening factor in this research. DCAA is striving to improve their oversight,
as was shown by the memo issued in 2008 for corrective changes. However, the GAO report
discussing fraud, waste and mismanagement previously was released in 2009, over one year
later, with continuing issues of risk to taxpayer dollars (Government Accountability Office
2009). While there is an effort to make progress, there is still a long way to go in the oversight
arena. If the United States is to continue in the current path of private contracting, it must bulk
up its agencies to protect taxpayer dollars. This would include granting the full time employees
requested in DCAA, DCMA, and the DOD Inspector General budget requests.
Based on the findings of this research, as a general rule, it is more cost effective to hire
government civilian personnel. Decreasing the government personnel and replacing with
private military contractors in order to cut government spending is not the best option.
Domestically, the roles provided by contractors could often be performed by government
civilians. Military and civil service retirees often fill these positions and bring experience and
personal connections that greatly benefit the government in ways a new civil service employee
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may not be able to. However, every circumstance is different, and based on the customer
requirements the decision should be made using cost analysis in order to obtain the most cost
efficient results. In the end the Department of Defense is often weighing the immediate needs
of the warfighter against taxpayer dollars. While there is no set answer, a general
understanding and more efficient government oversight would go a long way to making this
process more effective for all users involved.
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